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COMMENT
RESTITUTION IN WASHINGTON CONTRACTS
The evolution of the remedy of restitution' has been most tenuous,
both with respect to its Anglo-American history2 and its Washington
development. The remedy has origins in both law and equity.' While
restitution as such is seldom mentioned in the cases, its principles often
underlie a strained rationale. Perhaps today, with the merger of law
and equity, restitution may be considered equitable in nature,' with
the doctrine of "unjust enrichment" its backbone. 5 The purpose of
this Comment is to examine the requisites and mechanics of the remedy of restitution for breach of contract, and how these principles have
been applied by the Washington court.
The scope of this Comment will be limited to discussion of restitution as an alternative remedy for a breach of contract by the defendant, and as a sole remedy for a plaintiff unable to enforce a contract
by reason of his own breach, his non-performance of a condition, or
the Statute of Frauds. Restitution as a remedy where no agreement
has been entered into, or where an agreement is void or voidable, will
not be treated, although some fraud and misrepresentation cases are
1 The word "restitution," when used in this Comment, is limited to the remedies described in sections 347-357 of the Restatement of Contracts.
2 Restitution is a slice of the law of quasi contracts.
Lord Mansfield's opinion in
Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005 (1760), is generally considered to mark the emergence
of quasi contract as a distinct species of common law obligation. WOODWARD, QUASI
CONTRACTS § 2 (1913). In holding that indebitatus assumpsit would lie against an indorsee of a note who had violated his agreement not to bring suit on the note against
the indorser, Lord Mansfield declared: "If the defendant be under an obligation, from
the ties of natural justice, to refund, the law implies a debt.. ." (Emphasis added.)
That assumpsit should be a vehicle for finding an implied obligation is not too surprising, considering that the extension of special assumpsit into the remedy termed indebitatus (or general) assumpsit, used in actions for debts, was achieved by finding an
implied promise to pay a debt. WOODWARD, QUAsI CONTRACTS at 3,4 (1913) ; KIEGWIN,
CASES, ComxON LAW PLEADING §§ 73, 74 (2d ed. 1934). Hence, in quasi contracts,
assumpsit was made to lie by finding both a fictitious debt and a fictitious promise to
pay such debt.
3 If for any reason the Chancellor regarded the restitutionary remedy in assumpsit
as not adequate to achieve justice, equitable relief was available, typically in the form
of a "bill for rescission and restitution." 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 330 (1950) [hereinafter cited as CORBIN] ; 5 id. § 1102.
4 See 5 CORBIN § 1103. In Peterson v. Boyd, 46 Wn.2d 97, 278 P.2d 400 (1955), the
court declared that it was immaterial whether the action was one in equity for rescission or was an action at law to recover money on a contract that has been rescinded,
since in either case principles of equity governed. See Annot., Action Involving Rescission or Right to Rescind Contract and to Recover Amount Paid Thereunder as One at
Law or in Equity, 95 A.L.R. 1000 (1935).
5 However, availability of restitution as a remedy for a breach of contract does not
depend wholly upon the idea that the defendant has been unjustly enriched by the plaintiff's part performance. 5 CORBIN 1107. This is illustrated by the result reached in
Dygert v. Hansen, 31 Wn.2d 858, 199 P.2d 596 (1948). See also note 68 infra.
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19601

"RESTITUTION

cited for principles which are equally germane to the restitution discussion.
Only a few Washington cases discuss the remedy of restitution as
such. Most often the court characterizes the action as "rescission,"
and hence a brief analysis of the meaning of this term is a requisite
preliminary to the restitution discussion.
The definition of "rescission" approved by most text-writers is that
it consists of a new contract the purpose of which is to discharge the
old,' and in this sense is referred to as "rescission by mutual assent"
or simply "mutual rescission." There must be mutual assent for this
rescission agreement,' but it may be implied from the conduct of the
parties.8 Since the most common mutual rescission fact pattern involves a bilateral contract with each party still subject to some duty
thereunder, the consideration requirement' is usually fulfilled by each
party agreeing to surrender his rights under the contract for the other
person's corresponding agreement.1" It is then a question of interpretation 1' whether such rescission agreements include a promise to make
restitution by returning payments made or paying for performance
rendered."2 The Washington court has indicated that the absence of
0

RESTATEmET, CoNTRACTs

5 CoRaiN § 1131.

§ 406 (1932)

[hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT];

§ 406, comment b.
Gooden v. Hunter, 154 Wash. Dec. 907, 344 P.2d 723 (1959) (where vendee abandoned contract for sale of boat, the vendors' subsequent repossession of the boat indicated that they "acquiesced" in the abandonment and elected to treat the contract as
being riscinded) ; Morango v. Phillips, 33 Wn.2d 351 at 357, 205 P.2d 892 (1949) and
cases cited therein ("Mutual rescission is a matter of contract... An assent to an offer
of rescission may be express or implied.") ; Ridder v. Cottle, 32 Wn.2d 538, 202 P.2d
741 (1949) (there was no implied acceptance by the vendor of an ice cream business of
the vendee's implied offer of rescission where the vendor did nothing with the business
property inconsistent with the vendee's contractual rights until after the vendee was in
default).
9 For exceptions to the requirement of consideration, see RESTATEmENT §§ 410-416.
10 RESTATEMENT § 406, comment a. It is immaterial that part of the contract was
performed on one side, and nothing on the other; or that one party was guilty of partial
breach. These matters merely pertain to mere adequacy of consideration. RESTATEUENT § 81. But distinguish this from the situation when one party wholly performs, or
there is a total breach.
-1 RESTATEMENT § 409. Note that the "restitution" here resembles specific performance of an implied in fact agreement, rather than a remedy for a breach of contract.
12 In an early case, Croup v. Humboldt Quartz & Placer Mining Co., 87 Wash. 248,
151 Pac. 493 (1915), the court said that when an obligee repudiates his contract, and
the obligor "acquiesces" therein, there is mutual rescission by the parties and the courts
will "leave the parties where they placed themselves." Although the issue in Croup
was whether the repudiation resulted in failure of consideration for the obligor's note,
it would still seem that the Washington court is stating that it will not be inclined to
find by interpretation a promise to make restitution in situations involving rescission
by mutual assent. However, in MeMillen v. Bancroft, 162 Wash. 175, 298 Pac. 460
(1931), where the vendor "acquiesced" in the vendee's abandonment of the contract, the
court held that this constituted mutual rescission and hence the parties were entitled to
restoration of their original rights. The Croup and McMillen cases can be factually
distinguished in that Croup involved an obligee who abandoned the contract while in
7 RESTATEMENT
8
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a forfeiture clause will be an important factor in finding such an implied promise to make restitution.1There is a second category of "rescission" employed by the courts
which affects the restitution remedy in an altogether different fashion.
This type may be designated "unilateral rescission," 4 and is effected
by the act of the injured party alone asserting his privilege not to perform further, such privilege having been created by the wrongdoer's
breach and not by the assertion.' Professor Corbin goes on to say
that the legal effect of such unilateral rescission is to extinguish the
injured party's own right to specific performance of the contract." As
will be described later, this results in the removal of one of the bars
McMillen the vendee (in a position similar to that of an "obligor") so acted, and it
can be logically argued that the vendee's "offer to rescind" would be more likely to
include a condition that the vendor make restitution of payments paid.
The Washington court has often made the statement, "to rescind a contract is to
declare it void in its inception, and restore the parties to their status quo." Russell v.
Stephens, 191 Wash. 314, 71 P.2d 30 (1937). When the court finds such a "rescission,"
the result is identical to interpreting a promise to make restitution in a mutual agreement of rescission, and should be construed as such.
In Van Keulen v. Sealander, 183 Wash. 634, 49 P.2d 19 (1935), it was held that the
vendee's mailing of a quitclaim deed of the property to the vendor, and the latter's
retention of the deed for three months, was not, of itself, sufficient to "establish a
mutual rescission." The court believed the vendee was merely trying to escape a bad
bargain, and hence permitted the forfeiture. Considerable discussion was given to the
import of "rescission," and the court seemed to recognize the principle of the interpretation of a promise to make restitution in mutual rescission, stating that "rescind" did
"not always imply such an abrogation of the contract ab initio as would impose upon the
vendor the obligation to restore the payments made..." This suggests, despite the
court's earlier statement, that mutual rescission was the basis of this decision, and that
a promise to make restitution was not found for the reason that the vendee studiously
avoided requesting a return of his payments during the three month period.
13 Gooden v. Hunter, 154 Wash. Dec. 907, 911, 344 P.2d 723 (1959)
("In the absence
of a forfeiture clause.., a vendor who rescinds must restore amounts paid on the purchase price... when the vendee, although in default, acquiesces in the rescission.").
However, this rule was borrowed from Tungsten Products, Inc. v. Kimmel, 5 Wn.2d
572, 105 P.2d 822 (1940), and other cases involving restitution rather than rescission
by mutual assent.
14 5 CORBIN § 1131; Van Keulen v. Sealander, supra note 12 (the court here refers
to "unilateral rescission," but its decision seems better explained as mutual rescission
without restitution) ; Lea v. Young, 168 Wash. 496, 12 P.2d 601 (1932) (vendee defaulted, vendor brought action to "rescind and cancel" the contract and was granted
forfeiture of the $2,796 in payments; the court stated the vendor's action of "rescission"
here amounted to an "election to terminate" the contract rather than mutual rescission.)
15 CORBIN § 1131.
Hence, unilateral rescission can be effected only when the other
party has committed a total breach.
16 Corbin, The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of Instalments Paid,
40 YALE L.J. 1013 (1931). This article was cited in Litel v. Marsh, 33 Wn.2d 441, 206
P.2d 300 (1949), the opinion expressly recognizing the principle that a vendee has no
right of restitution while the vendor still has a right to specific performance of the contract. The reason for this rule is simply that it would be futile for the plaintiff-vendee
to recover payments if the vendor could compel him to pay the entire price by an action
of specific performance. Unilateral rescission removes this obstacle. In an earlier case,
Russell v. Stephens, 191 Wash. 314, 71 P.2d 30 (1937), the court reached a similar
result under election of remedies reasoning; stating that upon the vendee's default in
payments, the vendor could: (1) declare the contract forfeited and, if the contract so
provided, retain the payments as liquidated damages, or the vendor could elect to bring
action for (2) specific performance or (3) damages actually suffered.
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to the wrongdoer's obtaining restitution under section 357 of the
Restatement.
Additional usages of rescission arise in decisions involving a contract which is voidable as a consequence of fraud," duress or undue
influence, 8 material misrepresentation of fact, 9 mistake of fact,2" or
impossibility. 2 Within these fact patterns, "rescission" is used to describe both (1) the timely assertion of the power to avoid such contracts, i.e., "disaffirmance," 22 and (2) the remedy of discharging such
contracts. While the remedy of rescission of voidable contracts has
many requirements identical to those of the remedy, of restitution,"
it differs in that affirmance24 of a voidable contract can result from a
mere "unreasonable delay"25 in disaffirming after acquiring knowledge
that such power is held.2 6 This exclusionary rule is more broad in its
application than any comparable bar to the restitution remedy. 7 However, the Washington court on occasion has apparently improperly imon the remedy of restitution,
posed the voidable contract limitation
2
under the guise of "acquiescence. 1 1
§§ 471, 476.
isId. §§ 495, 496.
19 Id. §§ 470, 476.
20 Id. § 502.
211d. §§ 454-469.
22 See RESTATEMENT §§ 488, 489.
23 The Restatement recognizes one such similarity where it states factors requiring
the return of the consideration received by the plaintiff, as a condition of restitution
(RESTATEMENT § 349), which are identical to the factors requiring an offer to restore
performance received as a condition of disaffirmance (RESTATEMENT § 480). Also compare sections 354 and 489 of the Restatement.
24 The injured party in voidable contract situations may have three possible things
he can do: seek a decree for reformation (RESTATEMENT § 491), disaffirm the contract
and sue for rescission (RESTATEMENT §§ 480-489), or affirm the contract and lose his
power of avoidance. This affirmance can be either by affirmative acts (RESTATEMENT
§ 484) or by an unreasonable delay in disaffirming (RESTATEMENT § 483(1).)
25 See RESTATEMENT § 483(2) for factors determining whether a delay is "unreasonable."
25 RESTATEMENT § 483 (1). The Washington court typically describes these acts as
"waiver." Salter v. Heiser, 39 Wn.2d 826, 239 P.2d 327 (1951) (lessees who continued
in possession of leased premises and brought action for damages after discovery of
lessor's fraud thereby "waived" their right to rescind); Coovert v. Ingwerson, 37
Wn.2d 797, 226 P.2d 187 (1951) (vendee "waived" his right to rescind by continuing
to use furnace up to time of trial).
27 There is an election of remedies with respect to restitution or damages, but it only
applies where the injured party makes an affirmative "manifested choice," rather than
by mere non-action. RESTATEMENT § 381 (1). Another doctrine to be considered with
respect to this area of conduct is "acceptance," also operating as a bar to restitution.
Acceptance also requires affirmative conduct. See note 80 infra.
28 A gross example of such confusion is found in Central Life Assur. Soc'y v. Impelmans, 13 Wn2d 632, 126 P2d 757 (1942), where the court denied restitution to a
vendee in default for the reason that the vendee had "waived the right to rescind" by
treating the contract as in force after having knowledge of the defect in title. The
court predicated this conclusion on the rule in fraudulent representation cases, and then
compounded its error by stating that the vendee was all the more required to act with
reasonable promptness in the case at hand, since there was no showing of fraud!
17 RESTATEMENT
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A remedy termed "rescission" is also given to both the vendor" and
vendee" ° under the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act. "Rescission"
as used in the act ought not overlap with the remedy of restitution.31
Confusion of the two is particularly unfortunate because of the large
role of "acceptance" in the Sales Act."
In the following discussion of the principles of restitution in Washington, the analyses of most of the cited cases involve the preliminary
question of which of the above senses the court is using "rescission."
RESTITUTION AS ALTERNATIVE REMEDY FOR TOTAL
BREACH OF CONTRACT

When there is total breach" of a contract, the injured party is discharged of his contractual duties34 and has the power to bring an action
against the wrongdoer.3" In all cases the injured party can maintain
an action for damages;" in some cases he will have the alternative of
suing for restitution." Whether restitution will be preferable to damages will depend on the circumstances of each individual case." The
discussion will now treat the elements required for the remedy of restitution to be available.
Requirement of total breach. To maintain an action for restitution
the injured party must allege and prove a total breach of the contract.3 " Total breach is generally established by: (1) non-performance
or prevention which is sufficiently "material" 40 that it discharges the
29 RCW 63.04.620. The effect of "rescission" under this section is to restore title in
the goods to the vendor and, in addition, to compensate him in damages for any loss
occasioned by the vendee's breach. This remedy can perhaps be compared to specific
restitution.
30 RCW 63.04.700 (1) (d). The effect of "rescission" under this section is to restore
payments on the price to the vendee, conditioned on the vendee's offering to return the
goods to the vendor. Since such action will not always result in a restoration of the
status quo ante, the remedy in this section should not be compared with restitution;
rather it resembles the old action of injunction and cancellation. 5 PAGE, CONTRACTS
§ 3023 at 5338 (2d ed. 1922).
31 Even where the vendee's "default in the payment of the price" in RCW 63.04.620
constituted total breach by the vendee, the vendor still would not have restitution available since in such a case the only performance due is a "sum of money constituting a

liquidated debt." RESTATEMENT § 350.

See discussion in notes 83 and 84 supra, and 171 infra.
33For a description of total breach, see RESTATEMENT §§ 275,276,313,316-318.
34 RESTATEMENT § 397.
35 RESTATEMENT § 313.
36 RESTATEMENT § 327.
37 Damages and restitution are alternative remedies, only one of which will be given
as a remedy for a breach of contract. RESTATEMENT § 384; Ahrens v.Ladley, 53 Wn.2d
507 at 510, 334 P.2d 778 (1959).
8 See discussion under sub section entitled, "Measure of Recovery," infra.
39 RESTATEMENT § 347; 5 CORBiN § 1104. The Washington court expressly stated
the requirement of total breach to maintain restitution as an alrernative remedy, citing
the aforementioned section of Corbin, in Ahrens v. Ladley, supra note 37.
40 Rules for determining "materiality" are described in RESTATEMENT §§ 275,276.
32
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plaintiff from any duty on his part, 1 or (2) non-performance which
is accompanied by an act of repudiation 2 by the wrongdoer.' s Where
the question is whether a breach is sufficiently "material" to be total,
the factual question is most difficult." However, such acts as the vendor's failure to furnish "good" title on the date specified in the contract,'" the vendor's merely phoning vendee and saying title report
was available when contract required vendor to "furnish" the report
within thirty days,46 the failure of a heating system to adequately heat
the purchaser's home in violation of vendor's express warranty,47 and
the discovery that a used steam plate press warranted to be "in good
working order" in fact had badly dented or pitted plates and a scored
and gouged hydraulic ram, 8 have all been indicated as constituting
"total breach" by the Washington court.
The picture is clearer where the wrongdoer effects a total breach by
coupling his non-performance with subsequent acts of repudiation. As
for what constitutes "repudiation," the Washington court has been
quite liberal. Wrongful sale of the property to third parties,49 declaration of forfeiture without serving the prescribed thirty-day notice, 50
repossession of property without notice to vendee,"' and in an extreme
case, the vendor's breach of his "duty of fair-dealing,"52 have all been
In Central Life Assur. Soc'y v. Impelmans, 13 Wn.2d 632, 126 P.2d 757 (1942), it was
held that a defect in the title as to a tiny strip of land which did not adversely affect
the operation of the apartment building, the main subject matter of the contract, was so
"inconsequential"
that the vendee was not entitled to rescind.
41
RESTATEMENT §§ 274,317.
42 See RESTATEMENT § 318, for conduct required to constitute "repudiation."
43 Bean v. Hallett, 40 Wn2d 70, 240 P.2d 931 (1952) (vendee defaulted in payments;

without sending the thirty-day notice of forfeiture required by the contract, the vendors
instructed the vendee's tenant to pay the rent to them; the court held the vendor's conduct constituted wrongful repossession of the property, a total breach, and hence the
vendee was granted restitution).
44 The problem is aggravated by the failure of the Washington court to consistently
employ the terms "total" and "partial" in its analyses. Shattuck, Contracts in Washington: 1937-1957, 34 WASH. L. Rxv. at 487 (1959).
45 Gillmore v. Green, 39 Wn2d 431, 235 P.2d 998 (1951) ; Bruckart v. Cook, 30
Wn.2d 4, 190 P.2d 725 (1948).
4
6 Kolosoff v. Turri, 27 Wn.2d 81, 176 P.2d 439 (1947).
47
Eliason v. Walker, 42 Wn.2d 473, 256 P.2d 298 (1953). Actually the granting of
"rescission" was based on the Uniform Sales Act provisions. However, there is
authority that the partial-total breach distinctions carry over into sales transaction. See
5 CORBIN § 1119.
48
Lacey Plywood Co. v. Wienker, 42 Wn2d 719, 258 P.2d 477 (1953).
4
0 Jackson v. White, 104 Wash. 643, 177 Pac. 667 (1919) ; Reidt v. Smith, 75 Wash.
365, 134 Pac. 1057 (1913).
50 Gibson v. Rouse, 81 Wash. 102, 142 Pac. 464 (1914).
51 Knowles v. LaPure, 189 Wash. 456, 65 P.2d 1260 (1937).
52 Stewart v. Moss, 30 Wn.2d 535, 192 P2d 362 (1948) (where the vendor refused
to allow the subject of the contract, a truck, to go into escrow so as to enable the
vendee to obtain a chattel mortgage thereon, so that he could obtain the cash necessary
to avoid forfeiture).
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found to entitle the vendee to restitution of payments under the
contract.
Proof of the total breach may be the most crucial hurdle facing the
vendee seeking restitution as an alternative remedy. It may be open
to question whether methods of discharge other than total breach will
satisfy this requirement."
Requirement that plaintiff offer restoration. The right to restitution
is conditioned upon the plaintiff's returning, or offering to return, what
he has received as part performance by the defendant.' This restoration of consideration must be made promptly after the plaintiff becomes aware of the defendant's breach. 5 Where land or unique chattels have been received by the plaintiff, he may be required to return
the specific property, in substantially as good condition as when it was
transferred to him. The Washington court has expressly rejected the
argument that this requirement of restoration, with respect to a tender
of deed and possession of premises by plaintiff-vendee to vendor, has
been negated by virtue of the Askford v. Reese5 7 statement that an
executory contract for the sale of real property conveys no interest to
the vendee."
53 Section 347 of the Restatement includes only total breach, but some cases hint
that other forms of discharge might also give rise to restitution. Johnson v. Stalcup,
176 Wash. 153, 28 P.2d 279 (1934) (house accidentally destroyed by fire; vendee
granted "rescission" on grounds of failure of consideration) ; Payette v. Ferrier, 20
Wash. 479, 55 Pac. 629 (1899) (See note 101 infra) ; Stewart v. Moss, supra note 52
(dictum to the effect that $2,000 of vendee's $3,000 recovery based on theory of failure
of consideration). There seems no logical reason why such forms of discharge as
failure of consideration (RESTATEMENT § 399), occurrence of a condition subsequent
(RESTATEMENT § 396) or cancellation (RESTATEMENT § 431 should not also give

rise to the restitutionary remedy. The Restatement does recognize that such other
forms of discharge as rescission (§ 409) and avoidance of voidable duties (§ 431, comment c) may also give rise to restitution. On the other hand, such modes of discharge
as accord and satisfaction, assignment, or novation obviously ought not create a right
to restitution.
54RESTATEMENT § 349(1) ; 5 CORIar § 1114; Hopper v. Williams, 27 Wn.2d 579,
179 P.2d 283 (1947) ; Erckenbrack v. Jenkins, 33 Wn.2d 126, 204 P.2d 831 (1949)
(vendee denied restitution of $2,000 down payment, the court stating that one who
demands "rescission" must restore whatever he may have received under the contract) ;
Miller v. Clithero, 191 Wash. 122, 70 P.2d 1021 (1937) (vendee denied rescission for
purchase of right to participate in expected profits from salvage operation where vendee
did not offer to return these rights upon learning they did not include ownership in the
salvage corporation, as was represented; the vendee's delay in seeking rescission until
after the salvage operation had failed indicated he was speculating on the outcome).
55 RESTATEMENT § 349(1) ; Eliason v. Walker, 42 Wn.2d 473, 256 P.2d 298 (953)
(the court here cites comment c of this Restatement section).
56 5 CORBIN § 1114. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Molitor, 46 Wn.2d 882, 285 P.2d 893
(1955). If in such a case the plaintiff is unable to return the property in such condition,
he will have no right to restitution. But there are qualifications to this rule. See
RESTATEMENT § 349, comment b.
57 132 Wash. 649, 233 Pac. 29 (1925).
58 Hopper v. Williams, supra note 54. The court stated that "rescission" was an
equitable action and hence restoration was still required due to the maxim, "he who
seek- equity must do equity."
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There are many limitations on this restoration requirement.59 In
, ° the Washington court found the venHolland Furnace Co. v. Korthl
dee did not "waive" his right to "rescind" where after giving prompt
notice of rescission and requesting the vendor to remove the furnace,
the vendee continued to use the furnace pending its removal. The
court has also recognized that a reasonable retention and use of the
goods may be necessary in order to determine the existence of a
breach; " and perhaps that this requirement of prompt restoration can
be waived by the defendant's offer to repair the goods and thereby
remove his breach, said repair being unsuccessful.62 The court has
indicated that where the plaintiff's complaint lists all the property involved, together with a prayer for parties to be restored to the status
quo, this is a sufficient restoration."
The requirement of restoration, or offer of restoration, is codified
in the Uniform Sales Act 6 and is recognized as necessary to obtain
"rescission" for breach of warranties."5
The Washington court has made a curious statement with regard
to the restoration requirement. In Hopper v. Williams,"6 another fraud
case, the court stated that "restoration or tender of restoration of property is not a condition precedent to the.., maintenance of an action
for the rescission of a contract for the purchase of land, but that it is
sufficient to show a willingness to do equity." Since the plaintiff here
did not offer to reconvey the real property he had received, and since
restitution was denied, the language can be passed off as dictum. The
statement itself defies analysis."

59 See RESTATEMENT

§

349(2).

60 43 Wn.2d 618, 262 P.2d 772 (1953). This case involved misrepresentation by the
vendor. Hence, the terms, "acceptance" and "waiver" must necessarily concern the
issue of whether the plaintiff-vendee affirmed the contract. However, the restoration
requirements in avoidable contracts is identical to that in restitution. Compare
RESTATEMENT
§ 840 (avoidable contracts) with RESTATEMENT § 349.
6
1 Eliason v. Walker, 42 Wn.2d 473, 256 P.2d 298 (1953) (vendee's use of heating
system for a three-month period was necessary in order for vendees to determine its
adequacy).
62

Id. But cf., Coovert v. Ingwersen, 37 Wn.2d 797, 226 P.2d 187 (1951). However,
the63Coovert case can be distinguished: see note 85 infra.
Bariel v. Tuinstra, 45 Wn.2d 513, 276 P.2d 569 (1954) (the vendee made no tender
nor offer to tender prior to the commencement of the action). In Hopper v. Williams,
supra note 54, the court denied restitution on the grounds of failure to tender restoration, laying stress on the fact that the plaintiff made no move to make such tender
during the trial itself, such deficiency being pointed out to them at that time.
64 USA 69(1) (d), codified in Washington as RCW 63.04.700(1) (d).
6
5 Eliason v. Walker, supra note 61.
60 27 Wn.2d 579 at 588, 179 P.2d 283 (1947) (vendee denied restitution of $1,135
down payment on installment contract where vendee failed to prove his allegations of
misrepresentation by the vendor, the court stressing the fact that the vendee made no
tender of deed nor surrender of premises to vendor.
67 The court reaffirmed its statement that one who demands rescission must offer to
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Requirement that the performance shall have been received by
the defendant. The basic concept of restitution is that the defendant
must give something back to the plaintiff. Hence, restitution is available
as a remedy, with respect to a performance by the plaintiff, only if (1) it
is a performance6 8 which the defendant has bargained for and received, or (2) if not bargained for, it is one from which he has in fact
received a benefit.69 However, restitution is not available for expenses
incurred merely in preparation, without any performance ever having
been rendered."0

Election of remedies as a bar to restitution. Under appropriate
circumstances, the plaintiff's right to restitution can be barred, due to
his manifesting a choice to sue for damages.7 1 The Washington court
has indicated that the plaintiff who is unsure of his proof can eliminate
any uncertainty as to which remedy to elect by alleging both claims
in his pleadings, and whichever claim he proves will be accepted.7
restore the status quo in Rummer v. Throop, 38 Wn.2d 624, 231 P.2d 313 (1951) quoting from Hopper. Since the plaintiff in both cases alleged fraud, it is possible the court
was confusing the requirements of disaffirmance with the restoration requirement.
Another possible explanation of the Hopper case is raised by the fact that it was characterized as an action to cancel the contract. Perhaps the court had in mind the equitable action of Injunction and Cancellation, which was granted only if it were possible to
place the adversary party in status quo. 6 PAGE, CONTRACTS § 3420 (2d ed. 1922).
However, since the Hopper opinion cites section 349 of the Restatement, it may be
hoped that the quote is nothing more than an extremely unartful paraphrase of the
restoration requirement.
68 "Performance" as used here includes services rendered and a requested forbearance in addition to transfer of property. 5 CORIN § 1107. Bebb v. Jordan, 111 Wash.
73, 189 Pac. 553 (1920) (architects recovered on quantum reruit for the reasonable
value of their services in preparing plans for defendant who changed his mind as to type
of building he wanted, hence such plans were never finished nor used) ; Dygert v.
Hansen, 31 Wn.2d 858, 199 P.2d 596 (1948) (plaintiffs recovered $1,135 as the reasonable value of their time expended in preparing halibut gear, even though, due to their
inexperience, such gear was only worth $600).
Restitution for the reasonable value of plaintiff's services, where the defendant is not
benefited thereby, constitutes a large area of restitution not predicated on unjust
enrichment. The Washington court has recognized that benefit to the employer need
not be alleged in these cases. Marcussen v. Greenwood, 154 Wash. Dec. 125, 338 P.2d
133 (1959).
69 RESTATEMENT § 348; 5 CORBIN § 1107. Dygert v. Hansen, 31 Wn.2d 858, 199 P.2d
596 (1948) (restitution granted for value of performance bargained for, where the
actual benefit to defendant was worth much less).
70 RESTATEMENT § 348, comment a; 5 CORBIN § 1107. This principle explains the
result in Stanek v. Peterson, 26 Wn.2d 385, 174 P.2d 308 (1946), although it apparently
was not considered by the court. See note 178 infra.
7' RESTATEMENT § 381. McKown v. Driver, 154 Wash. Dec. 39, 337 P.2d 1068
1959 (the court stated that where a vendor breaches an executory contract for the sale
of real property, the vendee has an election to sue for specific performance, damages,
or restitution of payments (upon returning property to vendor) ; and that the prosecution to a final judgment of any one of these three remedies would constitute a bar to
the others under the election of remedies rule). Compare Willis T. Batcheller, Inc. v.
Welden Constr. Co., 9 '"n.2d 392, 115 P.2d 696 (1941).
72 Marcussen v. Greenwood, 154 Wash. Dec. 125, 338 P.2d 133 (1959) (a complaint
may contain one cause of action on an alleged express contract, and another concerning
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Plaintiff's full performance as a bar to restitution. Where a plaintiff has fully performed his part of a contract and the only part of the
agreed exchange that has not been rendered by the defendant is a
sum of money constituting a liquidated debt, then the remedy of restitution is not available to the plaintiff." The reason for this rule is
that such a plaintiff can get a money judgment for the amount of the
liquidated debt. Justice does not require that the plaintiff should have
an alternative remedy of restitution for the value of his performance,
since he is able to get substantially the agreed exchange he desired
in the first place.7"
Full performance by the plaintiff will not make restitution unavailable, however, if any part of the agreed exchange from the defendant is something other than a liquidated debt.75 Nevertheless, if
the defendant substantially performs this unliquidated portion of the
bargain, then restitution will be barred.7
Where a contract is "divisible, 77 then restitution is unavailable as
to any part of such contract where the plaintiff has fully performed
his part and the equivalent portion to be rendered by the defendant
is a liquidated sum of money."
Accepting performance with knowledge of a breach as a bar to
restitution. The "acceptance"" of a defective or incomplete performance with knowledge of such faults makes restitution unavailable. 0
There is an exception to this rule where the performance accepted by
the same transaction based upon quantum meruit). Accord, Adjustment Dept. v.
Brostrom, 15 Wn2d 193, 130 P.2d 67 (1942).
73 RESTATEMENT §§ 350, 351; 5 CoRniN §§ 1110, 1111. In Ahrens v. Ladley, 53
Wn.2d 507, 334 P.2d 778 (1959), an excellent opinion by Judge Hunter, the aforementioned sections of the Restatement and Corbhi were cited and accurately applied,
holding thereby that an employee had no right to the alternative remedy of restitution
where
the price per day for his services was stipulated in the employment contract
74
This is simply an application of the requirement in equity that the plaintiff lack
an adequate remedy at law.
75 RESTATEMENT § 350.
76
RESTATEMNT § 350, comment c.
77
For the elements requirement for a contract to be deemed "divisible," see RFSTATEMENT § 266, comment c.
8
7 RESTATEMENT § 351. Ahrens v. Ladley, supranote 73 (defendant owned a working
share in a co-operative plywood corporation; plaintiff agreed to perform the work
defendant was required to do under such share, and any wages plaintiff received thereby
in excess
of stipulated amounts were to be paid to defendant).
70
The language of the Washington court in describing this defense is apt to be in
terms of "waiver" or "acquiescence." It is critical that this legal characterization be
distinguished from "acquiescence," when used to describe affirmance of a voidable
contract, since conduct which will create the latter relationship should be more broad.
See notes 24, 26, 27, and their textural referents.
8 RESTAT
NT § 353. While the Restatement treats the effect of such conduct as a
separate rule of restitution, it would seem proper to say the legal effect of such conduct
is to waive the materiality of the defendant's breach, thus making restitution unavailable
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the plaintiff is so connected with his own land or chattels that its rejection would require their abandonment or expensive alteration. 8
The Restatement takes cognizance of the further qualification that
restitution is not barred the plaintiff when, subsequent to his acceptance, the defendant's nonperformance or repudiation becomes sufficiently serious as to constitute total breach notwithstanding the plaintiff's prior conduct. 2
The rule as to acceptance is substantially embodied in section 69(3)83
of the Uniform Sales Act, with respect to the buyer's remedy for breach
of warranty in sales transactions and contracts to sell involving chattels84 as subject matter.8 5
Statute of limitations. The Washington court has indicated that the
81 RESTATEMENT
82 RESTATEMENT

§ 353.
§ 353,

comment

b.

RCW 63.04.700(3). See also RCW 63.04.490. The finding of "acceptance" by the
purchaser in a Uniform Sales Act transaction terminates his right to rescind, but leaves
him the alternative remedy of damages. RCW 63.04.500. Hence, the legal effect is
identical to that of the restitution brand of "acceptance."
84 The Uniform Sales Act applies to both sales and contracts to sell "goods." RCW
63.04.040. "Goods" are defined in the act as "all chattels personal other than things in
action and money. The term includes emblements, industrial growing crops, and things
attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before sale or
under the contract of sale." RCW 63.04.755. The act was passed in 1925 in Washington. Wash. Ex. Sess. Laws 1825, c. 142.
85 Holland Furnace Co. v. Korth, 43 Wn.2d 618, 262 P.2d 772 (1953) (the court
held that continued use of a home heating installation by the purchaser after giving the
vendor prompt notice of the rescission and requesting that he remove the installation,
for a period of eight months, did not constitute a "waiver or abandonment" of the
rescission) ; Eliason v. Walker, 42 Wn.2d 473, 256 P.2d 298 (1953) (the purchaser's
delay in electing to rescind a contract for the purchase and installation of a heating
system, for a period of three months, during which time the vendor was attempting to
improve the system, and after such election the purchaser ceased using the system, did
not constitute "waiver" of the purchaser's right to rescind. The court here also made
the statement: "Diligence in rescission is a relative question, and whether or not there
has been an unreasonable delay in a given case depends upon the particular circumstances of that case.") ; Smelt Fisherman's Ass'n v. Soleim, 39 Wn.2d 524, 236 P.2d
1057 (1951) (purchaser of smelt did not "waive" his right to rescind where he paid
the vendor the full purchase price after having knowledge that the smelt were spoiled
where vendor's agent threatened to sell no more fish to purchaser if he did not pay, and
the latter feared his business would be damaged thereby) ; Coovert v. Ingwersen, 37
Wn.2d 797, 226 P.2d 187 (1951) (purchasers did "waive" their right to rescind by
continuing to use the heating system up to the time of the trial, a period of three
months after they had elected to rescind and demanded that the vendor remove the
installation; the court's readiness to find acceptance here may have been due to the fact
that it was not entirely clear whether there was in fact a breach of warranty) ; Sloan
v. State, 161 Wash. 414, 297 Pac. 194 (1931) (purchaser "waived" his right to rescind
where he retained the subject matter of the contract, furniture, for a period of two
years, without offering to return it to the builder) ; McCaw v. Advance-Rumley
Thresher Co., 158 Wash. 533, 291 Pac. 319 (1930) (purchaser of two combine
harvesters held to have "accepted" the machines and therefore could not claim a
breach of warranty, by continuing to use the machines to harvest his crops, and making
payments thereon, despite knowledge of the defect, and made no offer to rescind for a
period of two years) ; Trunk v. Stewart, 146 Wash. 131, 262 Pac. 143 (1927) (purchaser of a dough mixing machine, upon breach of an express warranty, was held to
83
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three-year-statute of limitations is applicable in actions for restitution.

6

Restitution as to contracts for the benefit of a third person. In
donee beneficiary contracts, upon repudiation or total breach by the
person who promised a benefit to the third-party beneficiary, the
promisee is usually given the remedy of restitution of the consideration
paid by him only if the promisor has been discharged of all further
duty to the beneficiary by a disclaimer"7 or reservation of such power.8 "
In creditor beneficiary contracts, the right to restitution is determined in the same manner as in donee beneficiary contracts, except as
affected by the fact that the promisee-plaintiff may have a somewhat more extensive power of discharging the duty of the promisordefendant, and hence the right of restitution in the promisee is more
extensive.8 9
Measure of recovery. The purpose of restitution is to place the
parties in status quo ante insofar as possible.90 This purpose is
achieved by the application of the following rules governing the recovery in restitution.
General rule. Where restitution is available as an alternative remedy, the judgment is for the reasonable value of the performance rendered by the plaintiff, measured as of the time it was rendered, less
the amount of benefits received as part performance of the contract
and retained by the plaintiff, plus interest." The important distinchave effectively rescinded by merely notifying the vendor to remove the machine, a
tender to return the machine not being necessary).
86 Geranios v. Annex Invs., Inc., 45 Wn.2d 233, 273 P.2d 793 (1954) (action for
"unjust enrichment," predicated on failure of consideration; barred by statute) ; Halver
v. Welle, 44 Wn.2d 288, 266 P.2d 1053 (1954) (action predicated on' doctrine of quasicontract, resulting from mistake of fact, barred by statute). See RCW 4.16.040(2)
and 4.16.080(3).
87 RESTATE:MENT §

137.

88 RESTATEMENT § 356(1) ; 5 CoRBiN § 1117.
so RESTATENMNT § 356, comments b, c. In donee beneficiary contracts, only T, (the
third party) has power to discharge his contractural rights, except when the contract
expressly reserves such power to P (the promisee). However, in creditor beneficiary
contracts, P has the power to discharge D's (the promisor's) duty to T at any time
before T has in any way changed his position in reliance of the contract. REsTATEMENT § 143. As long as P has this power, he can exercise it by electing restitution in
his own favor as remedy for D's breach. But, if P loses this power to discharge, he
cannot get restitution as his alternative remedy unless such power was expressly
reserved
to P in the contract. 5 CoRmN § 1117.
90
Eliason v. Walker, 42 Wn2d 473, 256 P.2d 298 (1935) ; Jones v. Grove, 76 Wash.
19, 135 Pac. 488 (1913).
92 REsTATEMNT § 347; 5 CoRB N § 1112. In a recent case, Bean v. Hallett, 40 Wn.2d
70, 240 P.2d 931 (1952), Judge Olson cited section 347 of the Restatement as authority
for a recovery of the payments made under the contract, with interest thereon at the
legal rate from the date of the vendor's breach, less the reasonable value of the use of
the property from the date the vendee entered into possssion to the date the vendor
repossessed. The only difficulty with this opinion arises from its citing two Washington cases to bolster the RESTATEMENT measure of recovery, namely: Knowles v. La-
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tion from damages9 2 is that the restitution yardstick is the amount for
which such services and materials as constituted the part performance
could have been purchased from one in the plaintiff's position," rather
than the losses caused and gains prevented by the defendant's breach.9'
The Washington court has refuted the concept95 that the measure
of recovery in restitution is the reasonable value of the plaintiff's performance, uncontrolled by the contract price. The court has stated96
that no recovery would be allowed in excess of the contract price.
These cases can be better explained as simply applying the rule98 that
the contract price is admissible as evidence of what was the "reasonable value" of the plaintiff's performance. Such evidence may well be
difficult to rebut.
Specific restitution. In some instances restitution is employed to
recover a specific thing rather than payment of money. If the perPure, 189 Wash. 456, 65 P.2d 1260 (1937) and Johnson v. Stalcup, 176 Wash. 153, 28
P.2d 279 (1934). The Johnson case involved a house accidentally destroyed by fire
while the contract for its sale was executory. The court held the vendee's action for
rescission on grounds of failure of consideration would lie, citing Ashford v. Reese,
132 Wash. 649, 233 Pac. 29 (1925). The Johnson case further ruled that the vendee's
recovery should be offset by the rental value of the property during his occupancy, as
distinguished from those cases where the failure of consideration consisted of total
failure of vendor's title. In the Knowles case, involving the ordinary forfeiture fact
pattern, the court cited and applied the recovery formula used in the Johnson case,
without taking cognizance of the fact it was applying a formula developed in the Ashford risk-of-loss fact patterns to an entirely different factual situation. While the appropriate recovery formulae in the Johnson and Knowles cases happened to be identical,
they ought not lend support to one another.
Where the subject matter of the sale is personal property, the "reasonable value of
the vendee's use of the property" will usually be in terms of depreciation rather than
rent. Cone v. Ariss, 13 Wn.2d 650, 126 P.2d 591 (1942) (vendee granted restitution
for payments made on car less depreciation to car, where contract unenforceable and
vendor repossessd).
92 RESTATEMENT § 329.
93
RESTATEMENT § 347, comment c.
14 A case illustrating the practical importance of this distinction is Dygert v. Hansen,
31 Wn.2d 858, 199 P.2d 596 (1948) (plaintiffs granted restitution for $1,135 even
though the value of their services to the defendant was only $600).
95 5 CoRIN § 1113.
96 Bailey v. Furleigh, 121 Wash. 207, 208 Pac. 1091 (1922) ( a contract to render
services at a fixed price per day fixes the measure of damages, and where the employee
was discharged before completion of the work, he cannot recover more on the theory
of quantum mneruit, for the reasonable value of his services; this statement may be no
more than dictum since the contract here provided for the employee to share in any
losses resulting from the project, and the employer here did in fact lose some $6,000) ;
Noyes v. Pugin, 2 Wash. 653, 27 Pac. 548 (1891) (the court here expressly refuted
the doctrine that where an employment contract was rescinded the employee may
recover the reasonable value of the services rendered, irrespective of the price stipulated and agreed upon by the parties. The court stated that such a measure of recovery
was valid where there was no contract stipulating remuneration. However, where the
parties themselves have agreed upon a price to be paid for the employee's services, it
was more just and equitable to make that price the measure of compensation for work
done under the contract).
97 This limitation does apply to cases involving section 357 of the Restatement,
where restitution is granted to a plaintiff himself guilty of total breach.
93 35 Am. JuR. Master and Servant § 54 at n. 15 (1941).
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formance received from the plaintiff by the defendant is the transfer
of land, or of goods or choses in action of a unique character, then
specific restitution may be allowed, resulting in the retransfer of the
property to the plaintiff.9 This remedy requires that the subjectmatter still exist and that the interests of innocent purchasers 0 0 and
creditors of the defendant are not unjustly affected.'
The most frequent fact pattern in which specific restitution is allowed involves an aged or infirm plaintiff transferring real property
to a defendant-child in consideration of the latter's promise to care
and support the plaintiff. 02 Upon the defendant's total breach or failure of consideration, such a plaintiff can obtain a decree for cancellation of the deed of conveyance and the restoration of ownership and
possession."'
09

RESTATEMANT § 354, 5 CoRai-- § 1120.

Gardner v. Frederick, 96 Wash. 324, 165 Pac. 85 (1917) (property conveyed by
aged parent under a written contract providing for future support and care as consideration; where the defendants wrongfully withheld support, it was held that rescission
could not be had because a portion of the land had been sold and conveyed to a third
person, but that an action for damages would lie).
101 One Washington case indicates a mortgage is not given the protection extended
creditors. In Payette v. Ferrier, 20 Wash. 479, 55 Pac. 629 (1899), involving a deed
made by a parent to a child in consideration of support and maintenance, upon failure
of consideration resulting from the death of the child the parent was granted rescission
and cancellation of the deed as against the administrator of the children's estate, the
guardian of minor grandchildren, and the nortgagee of the property from the children.
However, the court stated that the mortgagee had constructive notice of the covenants
to support contained in the deed, and hence this result can be explained on the argument
that the mortgagee was not "unjustly affected."
100

102
103

5 CoiuIN § 1120.

The Washington court granted specific restitution in Gustin v. Crockett, 51
Wash. 67, 97 Pac. 1091 (1908). However, the court stated its decision was based on
the equitable theory of rescission of contract and cancellation of the deed for a willful
violation of contract. Rescission and cancellation of a conveyance was also granted in
Payette v. Ferrier, supra note 101.
The holding in the Payette case that specific restitution would be granted upon a
mere failure of consideration, regardless of whether or not it was willful, was seemingly
contracted by some dicta in Hesselgrave v. Mott, 23 Wn.2d 270, 160 P.2d 521 (1945).
However, Hesselgrave was a proper application of the principle that the purpose of
restitution is to return the parties to the status quo ante combined with the rule allowing
compensation for improvements made before granting specific performance (see textual
reference at note 104 below). In Hesselgrave the original value of the property deeded
by the plaintiff was only $250, while its value after being enhanced by the transferee's
improvements was $1,500. The court properly pointed out that to grant "rescission
and cancellation" of the deed under these facts would be grossly unjust to the transferee, since the plaintiff's aged and infirm condition precluded the likelihood of his
ever being able to reimburse for the value of the improvements, and hence the plaintiff
was limited to a money recovery.
Specific restitution was also denied in the following cases: Ockfen v. Ockfen, 35
Wn2d 439, 213 P.2d 614 (1950) (holding appears to be that there was in fact no
contract to support, but rather the deed from the parent to her son was a gift) ; Carey
v. Powell, 32 Wn.2d 761, 204 P.2d 193 (1949) (defendant-transferee here committed
no total breach, instead the parent herself repudiated the contract); Thilman v.
Thilman, 30 Wn.2d 743, 193 P.2d 674 (1948) (mother deeded land to son in consideration for his promise to support; one year later the son died; both specific restitution
due to the absence of total breach. It is important to distinguish "acceptance" from the
"acquiescence" problem in note 171 supra).
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In granting specific restitution, the court will consider part performance and improvements made by the defendant, and will allow compensation therefor, requiring an accounting if necessary.'
Avoidable harm. Restitution will not be awarded with respect to a
part performance rendered with knowledge that the other party has
repudiated the contract, if the total amount awarded would be increased thereby.'Y5 This limitation on the restitution recovery is comparable to the limitation on damages as a result of the "doctrine of
avoidable consequences."'0 6 The Washington court has extended this
principle to deny restitution with respect to performance rendered by
a plaintiff charged with knowledge that such performance will be of
no value to the defendant. 7
Forfeiture. In installment contracts for the sale of land, where it is
clearly shown that the vendor is guilty of total breach, the Washington
court has consistently awarded the vendee restitution of the installments paid on the contract by the vendee, whether or not a forfeiture
clause was present. 8
and damages were denied the mother here, the court stating there was no failure of
consideration here since the mother had assumed the risk of the son's death, by virtue
of the express provision in the contract that the son would perform "so long as he is
physically able"). The Thilman case seems inconsistent with the spirit of Payette v.
Ferrier, supra. However, the court referred to the Payette case and distinguished it
for lacking the provision contemplating the possibility of the son dying before the
parents, the apparent result of this being that the death of the son in Thilnan did not
thereby constitute total breach.
This area of specific restitution should not be confused with the constructive trust
cases. Both involve deeds by aged or infirm persons to their children or trusted friends.
However, while specific restitution is employed to rectify a total breach by the transferee, constructive trusts are generally imposed to rectify fraud by the transferee.
BOGERT, TRUSTS, § 77 (3rd ed. 1952). In the majority of states holding that the transferee's mere breach of promise, where a "confidential relationship" exists between the
two, is sufficient to raise a constructive trust, considerable overlapping would be
expected between these two remedies. However, Washington requires fraud in the
inception in addition. Dowgialla v. Knevage, 48 Wn.2d 326, 294 P.2d 393 (1956).
Hence, it is critical that where the fraud element is lacking, the transferor select
specific restitution as his theory.
104 Hesselgrave v. Mott, supra note 103.
105 RESTATEMENT § 352.
106 Compare the aspect of the avoidable consequences rule stated in 5 CORBIN § 1039

at n. 18, with the restitution requirement stated in section 352 of the Restatement.
107 Bebb v. Jordan, 111 Wash. 73, 189 Pac. 553 (1920) (architect could not recover
on quantum ineruit for that portion of his services in drawing plans for a building
which would be a violation of the building ordinances, and hence were useless to the
defendant). The theory behind Bebb may be that the defendant would have repudiated
the contract had the architect acted properly by disclosing the defect in the building for
which he was commissioned to draw plans.
108 Cases granted the vendee restitution where the contract did contain a forfeiture
clause: Bean v. Hallett, 40 Wn.2d 70, 240 P.2d 931 (1952) ; Knowles v. LaPure, 189
Wash. 456, 65 P.2d 1260 (1937) ; Gibson v. Rouse, 81 Wash. 102, 142 Pac. 464 (1914).
Restitution granted where the contract did not contain a forfeiture clause: Connelly v.
Malloy, 106 Wash. 464, 180 Pac. 469 (1919) ; Jackson v. White, 104 Wash. 643, 177
Pac. 667 (1919) ; Reidt v. Smith, 75 Wash. 365, 134 Pac. 1057 (1913).
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RESTITUTION AS SOLE RIEMEDY WHERE PLAINTIFF GUILTY
OF TOTAL BREACH

General rule10 9 A plaintiff who is himself in substantial default may
nevertheless have a right to restitution. In the words of section 357 of
the Restatement of Contracts:
Where the defendant fails or refuses to perform his contract and is
justified therein by the plaintiff's own breach of duty or non-performance of a conditon, but the plaintiff has rendered a part performance
under the contract that is a net benefit to the defendant, the plaintiff
can get judgment... if (a) the plaintiff's breach or non-performance
is not willful"10 and deliberate; or (b) the defendant, with knowledge
that the plaintiff's breach of duty or non-performance of condition has
occurred or will thereafter occur, assents to the rendition of the part
performance, or accepts the benefit of it, or retains property received
although its return in specie is still not unreasonably difficult or injurious.
Note that restitution is the only remedy available to a plaintiff in
total default.1 This extension of the restitution remedy no doubt
evolved from the court's oft stated unwillingness to grant forfeiture.
Measure of recovery. Just as the application of the restitution remedy is much less extensive when the plaintiff is in substantial default,
so also is the measure of recovery. The formula in section 357 is the
reasonable value of the plaintiff's part performance less the value of
any performance by the defendant and less any damages caused to
the defendant by the plaintiff's breach.11 2 Moreover, if this figure is
in excess of the value which would have been paid to the plaintiff
under the contract for such part performance, then this lesser figure
shall govern."'
Forefeiture and installment contracts. The early Washington cases
permitted forfeiture of installments paid by the defaulting vendee
where the contract contained a forfeiture clause."1 Later cases deSee 5 CoRBIN §§ 1122-1135.
That the court considered the vendee guilty of "willful, persistent and material
breach" was an alternative ground for denying restitution in Litel v. Marsh, 33 Wn.2d
441, 206 P.2d 300 (1949). See note 129 infra.
1115 CoRan, §§ 1126, 1127.
109

110

112

In two cases the court has indicated the necessity of the defendant alleging and

proving the damages caused by the plaintiff's breach. Gooden v. Hunter, 154 Wash.
Dec. 907, 344 P2d 723 (1959) ; Tungsten Products, Inc. v. Kimmel, 5 Wn.2d 572, 105

P.2d 822 (1940).

113 5 CoRnix § 1124. Hence the contract price does limit recovery here, in contrast
with recovery under section 347. See note 95 mupra, and its textual referent.
114 Pease v. Baxter 12 Wash. 567 (1895) (forfeiture allowed where defendantvendee had paid over J13,000 of the $26,000 price on a contract for sale of land, then
defaulted in payments); Reddish v. Smith, 10 Wash. 178 (1894). The Washington
court in the Reddish case, at page 184, declared "the right to rescind belongs only to
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veloped the refinement that forfeiture would not be allowed unless the
clause were a valid liquidated damages provision as distinguished from
a penalty." 5
The defaulting vendee cases of the past few decades present a jungle
of holdings for the Washington researcher. The typical fact pattern
involves an installment contract for the sale of land containing a forfeiture clause where the vendee has defaulted in his payments and is
bringing the action to "rescind" the contract and recover the installments paid."' The Washington court has taken the following positions: 1) a minority of the decisions granted the vendee restitution of
the payments," 7 2) a large group of cases granted the vendor forfeiture," and 3) a majority of the cases deny forfeiture and reinstate the
contract on condition that the vendee pay either the installments due
or the full balance".9 due within a certain time period, usually termed
the "grace period."' 2 ° The latter remedy in effect gives the defaulting
vendee a conditional right of redemption.
While the redemption approach does not have the harshness of a forfeiture, neither does it give the vendee in default the advantages of
the party who is himself without default." Apparently this dictum has been qualified
by the section 357 cases, although it is still often quoted by the court. Litel v. Marsh,
33 Wn.2d 441, 206 P.2d 300 (1949).
On the other hand, the court denied forfeiture against a defaulting vendee where the
contract failed to include a forfeiture clause. Tungsten Products, Inc. v. Kimmel,
supra note 112; Jones v. Grove, 76 Wash. 19, 135 Pac. 488 (1913).
11 Miller v. Moulton, 77 Wash. 325, 137 Pac. 491 (1914).
116 Another typical fact pattern having the same legal effect, and hence included
under the aforementioned grouping is where, subsequent to the vendee's default, the
vendor commits a material breach, but the vendee's "acquiescence" in the defect operates
to Waive the materiality of the breach. See RESTATEMENT § 275 (d).
117 Gooden v. Hunter, 154 Wash. Dec. 907, 344 P.2d 723 (1959) ; Stewart v. Moss,
30 Wn.2d 535, 192 P.2d 362 (1948).
11 Mathews v. Heiser, 42 Wn.2d 326, 255 P.2d 366 (1953) ; Edwards v. Meader,
34 Wn.2d 921, 210 P.2d 1019 (1949) ; Litel v. Marsh, surpra note 114; Erckenbrack v.
Jenkins, 33 Wn.2d 126, 204 P.2d 831 (1949) ; Merlin v. Rodine, 32 Wn.2d 757, 203 P.2d
683 (1949).
119 In the minority of cases where the defaulting vendee is required to pay the entire
balance due, usually such vendee had indicated his ability to make such payments.
Radach v. Prior, 48 Wn.2d 901, 297 P.2d 605 (1956) (vendee had tendered full balance
due prior to vendor's suit to declare forfeiture) ; Moeller v. Good Hope Farms, Inc.,
35 Wn.2d 777, 215 P.2d 425 (1950) (at the end of first grace period, vendee tendered
part of balance in cash, plus a notice by a bank to give loan for balance if title good;
upon appeal, court gave vendee an additional grace period to pay the balance, imposing
a concurrent duty on the vendor to tender good title). But compare Central Life
Assur. Soc'y v. Impelmans, 13 Wn.2d 632, 126 P.2d 757 (1942).
120 Radach v. Prior, supra note 119 (vendee in default granted thirty-day grace
period to pay installments past due) ; Knoblauch v. Sanstrom, 37 Wn.2d 266, 223 P.2d
462 (1950) (vendee granted thirty days to pay payments past due) ; Moeller v. Good
Hope Farms, Inc., supra note 119 (vendee granted sixty days to pay full balance due) ;
Bruckart v. Cook, 30 Wn.2d 4, 190 P.2d 725 (1948) ; Crook v. Tudor, 28 Wn.2d 289,
182 P.2d 740 (1947) (vendee granted thirty-day grace period to pay installments past
due, plus vendor's costs in the legal action including $100 attorney fees) ; Dill v.
Zielke, 26 Wn.2d 246, 173 P.2d 977 (1946) ; Central Life Assur. Soc'y v. Impelmans,
supra note 119 (vendee granted ten days to pay full balance due).
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the section 357 restitution remedy. In the vast majority of cases the
redemption relief was originally granted by the trial court, and the
supreme court affirms unless there has been an "abuse of discretion.' 21
The Washington court has spelled out the "equities" justifying the
exercise of such discretion.' On one occasion the Washington court
reversed the trial court's granting of the redemption relief, it being
clear the requisite "equities" did not exist." 3 The similarity of the
redemption relief to remittitur 24 in its procedural aspects is emphasized by the fact that both can be granted at first instance by the
supreme court itself. 5
The large number of decisions where the court has seemingly ignored the restitution issue by making use of the redemption device
discourages conclusions as to whether Washington conforms to Professor Corbin's opinion that a "very great majority" of cases, nationwide, have refused restitution of installments in favor of a defaulting
purchaser of land or chattels.' On the other hand, the substantial
number of cases 27 granting forfeiture might be said to answer this
question affirmatively. However, Corbin observes 28 that the decisions
denying restitution can be justified on one or more of the following
grounds: (1) the retention of the right to specific performance by
the injured party, the vendor, in contracts for sale of land or unique
chattels,'29 (2) the failure of the plaintiff-vendee to show that the inRadach v. Prior, Bruckart v. Cook, Crook v. Tudor, Dill v. Zielke, supra note 120.
Radach v. Prior, supra note 119 (vendee's payments amounting to 680 of price,
improvements on property by vendee, vendee's subsequent tender of payments due and
also of entire balance due, and the vendor's retention of benefits received from vendee
subsequent to expiration of forfeiture notice.) Dill v. Zielke, supra note 120 (vendee's
payments amounting to 45% of price, vendee only $36 in default, vendee tendered payments due just three days after expiration of forfeiture notice).
123 Krieg v. Salkovics, 18 Wn.2d 180, 138 P.2d 855 (1943). See note 147 infra. The
court indicated that had the original vendee, rather than his assignee, been the defendant, the trial court's granting of the grace period would have been sustained.
124 RCW 4.76.030.
125 The grace period was granted on the supreme court level in Moeller v. Good
Hope Farms, Inc. and Central Life Assur. Soc'y v. Impelmans, supra note 119. Similar
action with respect to the remittitur procedure is found in Puget Sound Lumber Co. v.
Mechanics' Ins. Co., 168 Wash. 46, 10 P.2d 568 (1932).
126 5 CoRBi 1129.
127 Note 118 supra.
128 Corbin, The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of InstallentsPaid,
40 YALE L. J.1013 (1931).
129 See RESTATEME1NT 357(1), comment b. Mathews v. Heiser, 42 Wn.2d 326, 255
P.2d 366 (1953) (vendee waived vendor's failure to provide good title on date specified;
vendee subsequently repudiated the contract and abandoned the property; the court
declared the vendee had breached the contract and hence could not "rescind," apparently
referring to "unilateral rescission," and denied restitution of the vendee's down payment) ; Gillmore v. Green, 39 Wn.2d 431, 235 P.2d 998 (1951) (court denied vendee's
action to rescind, stating that since the vendee was in default, the vendor had the right
to demand specific performance, and hence the "vendee cannot rescind the contract and
claim restitution"). Litel v. Marsh, 33 Wn.2d 441, 206 P.2d 300 (1949) (vendee, in
121
.22
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jury to the vendor caused by the vendee's breach is less than the
installments he has paid,' and (3) the construing of an express provision in the contract for money paid to be retained by the vendor as
a genuine provision for liquidated damages 3 . and not a penalty. 2
It is suggested that failure to show the absence of a right to specific performance in the vendor is the basis for many Washington
cases.3 3 denying restitution to the defaulting vendee. One decision
expressly recognized this requirement. 4 It might be noted that a
finding of "unilateral rescission"'3 5 by the vendor will remove this
obstacle to restitution, since the legal effect of such conduct is to
extinguish the vendor's own right to specific performance. 6 The fact
that the few Washington cases' granting restitution to a vendee in
default all involved contracts with chattels as subject matter permits
an inference as to the efficacy of the absence-of-specific-performance
requirement, but leaves Washington with no case directly illustrating
conduct which constitutes "unilateral rescission." However, a guide
may be found in Professor Corbin's description of such rescission as
"an assertion [by the vendor] of his own privilege not to perform
default in payments, repudiated contract; the court stated the vendee did not have the
right to "rescind" and indicated three alternative grounds for denying restitution: the
vendee's breach was "willful," the vendor still had the right to specific performance of
the contract, and the vendee had failed to prove that the payments exceeded the vendor's
damages) ; Bayley v. Lewis, 39 Wn.2d 464, 236 P.2d 350 (1951) (defendant granted
specific performance of contract; plaintiffs' cross-action for restitution of consideration
paid on contract denied). Compare the Bayley case with Hebb v. Severson, 32 Wn.2d
159, 201 P.2d 156 (1948) (vendor seeks specific performance, vendee brings cross-action
for restitution; restitution granted and specific performance denied).
130 See RESTATEMENT § 357(1), comments d and g. Washington cases are cited in
note 139 infra.
131 The requirements for a liquidated damages provision have become fairly settled
in Washington, and the mere labeling as such has little effect. See Shattuck, Contracts
in Rashington, 1937-1957, 34 WAst. L. Rv. at 501 (1959). Erckenbrack v. Jenkins,
33 Wn.2d 126, 204 P.2d 831 (1949) (forfeiture of $2,000 down payment allowed to
vendor as "liquidated damages"). Bruckart v. Cook, 30 Wn.2d 4, 190 P.2d 725 (1948)
(forfeiture of $1,000 down payment, plus several installments, allowed as liquidated
damages where total price only $3,000; but vendee allowed grace period).
132 The Restatement also denies restitution where the plaintiff's performance is
"merely a payment of earnest money." RESTATEMENT § 357(2). Edwards v. Meador,
34 Wn.2d 921, 210 P.2d 1019 (1949) (vendor is entitled to forfeit earnest money paid
where the vendees refused to complete the purchase). However, the Washington court
has indicated it will not deny restitution just because a contract is labeled an "earnest
money receipt." Stewart v. Moss, 30 Wn.2d 535, 192 P.2d 362 (1948). Hebb v. Severson, supra note 129 (plaintiff-vendee paid $1,000 on contract as "earnest money":
plaintiff granted restitution of the $1,000 where vendor failed to perform covenant to
furnish unincumbered title or earnest money to be refunded. Probably the only effect
of the label "earnest money" is to declare the intention of the parties to allow forfeiture, and hence the contract must still meet the requirements of a "genuine" liquidated damages provision. RESTATEMENT § 357, comment i.
133 See cases cited in note 129 supra.
134 Litel v. Marsh, supra note 129.
135 See notes 14-16 supra, and their textual referents.
136 5 CORBTN § 1131.

17 Note 117 supra.
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further.'118 As examples of such "assertion," Corbin cites'a vendor

who expressly says, "I rescind the contract for your breach," and-a
vendor who says nothing, but proceeds to sell the land to some one
else.
Failure to prove payments exceed damages may also explain many
Washington cases denying restitution.'3 It seems only proper that the
plaintiff seeking restitution should have the burden of proving the
amount he ought recover, the same as in an action for damages. 4 °
Hence, in cases where the installments paid are small as compared
to the total contract price, the plaintiff will be hard put to meet this
burden.
It is the writer's opinion that the Washington cases and section
3571 both suggest a fourth requirement for granting restitution,
namely, that the plaintiff have some semblance of moral justification
for his breach, 42 unless the defendant, with knowledge of the plaintiff's
4
breach, "acquiesces"'4 in the part performance.
Moreover, it is suggested that the "grace period" is a sound procedure in many instances for supplementing the policy of section 357.
The Restatement rule is an attempt to compromise two conflicting
138 5 CoRBrN § 1131.
3'o Mathews v. Heiser, 42 Wn.2d 326, 255 P.2d 366 (1953) (vendee repudiated contract for sale of resort property for $70,000, on which vendee had paid $5,000; the court
denied the vendee's action to recover the $5,000 on the grounds there was "no rescission ;" the court stated that the vendor failed to establish any damage as a result of
vendee's breach, and denied his cross-complaint for damages, saying the vendor's subsequent sale of the property for $56,000 did not adequately establish the market value).
An alternate ground for this decision is that the vendor still had the right to specific
performance. See note 129 spra. Moreover, since the court characterized the $5,000
as a "down payment," it may have been considered as liquidated damages, although this
issue was not discussed. Bock v. Celleyham, 100 Wash. 545, 171 Pac. 525 (1918)
(vendee denied restitution of $2,000 down payment on installment contract where total
price was $10,000).
340 "No vendee has a right of restitution... while the vendor's damages exceed the
vendee's payments, and in the latter situation the burden of making a prima facie
showing is on the vendee." Litel v. Marsh, 33 Wn.2d 441 at 448, 206 P.2d 300 (1949)
(the court here quoting from Corbin's article cited in note 128 supra).
'4' RESTA
TMENT
§ 357 (1) (a), (b), and comment f.
142 Stewart v. Moss, 30 Wn.2d 535, 192 P.2d 362 (1948), see note 147 infra. In
granting the vendee restitution, the court stated that: "Except where the.., defective
performance is of a sort that indicates moral obliquity ... the tendency is to grant...
[the plaintiff in default] restitution . . ." quoting from 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTs §
1473 (rev. ed. 1936).
143 A comparison of the section 357 and Uniform Sales Act language indicates similarity in the conduct which will establish the Restatement "acquiescence" and the sales
act "acceptance." RESTATEMENT § 357(1) (b) ; RCW 63.04.490. It is important, however, not to confuse these two concepts since "acceptance"' by a plaintiff-buyer will
make unavailable his remedy of rescission for a breach of warranty. RCW 63.04.700 (3).
See discussion at note 80 supra, and notes 173, 174 infra, and their textual referents.
'44 In Radach v. Prior, 48 Wn.2d 901, 297 P.2d 605 (1956), the court recognized
that the vendor's retention of vendee's payment of taxes made after vendor's notice of
forfeiture expired constituted unjust enrichment to the vendor, but used this as one of
the "equities" justifying the granting of a grace period to the vendee.
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policies:.46 the dislike for harsh forfeitures even though expressly provided for in the contract, and on the other hand the desire for certainty
and the fear that restitution, used too broadly, might be employed by
vendees to avoid bad bargains." Where the facts do not satisfy the
stringent requirements of the section 357 remedy, the use of the grace
period enables the court to avoid the opposite extreme of forfeiture,
so long as the vendee is willing and able to carry out the conditions.
Moreover, the court has indicated it will not tolerate any sharp practice
on the part of the vendor which will hinder the vendee in meeting the
required condition."'
It should again be stressed that the Washington court has granted,
albeit in a minority of instances, the remedy of restitution to a defaulting vendee. 4 The fact that the court in the numerous cases granting
redemption, and in the less numerous cases granting forfeiture, did not
feel the need to overrule the cases granting restitution also lends weight
to the validity of section 357 in Washington. Considering the broad
applicability of the aforementioned exclusionary rules, it is not surprising that the defaulting vendee's right to restitution is so rarely
decreed.
Conditional sale of chattel. Until a few months ago it appeared
well settled in Washington that forfeiture would be granted against a
vendee who defaulted in the payment of installments for the conditional sale of a chattel, where the contract contained a forfeiture
clause. 4 ' While the origin in the Washington cases of this rule is some145 In Stewart v. Moss, 30 Wn.2d 535, 192 P.2d 362 (1948), the Washington court
quoted a passage from 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1473 (rev. ed. 1936), recognizing
these opposing legal policies, and suggesting that the dislike for forfeitures was becoming the dominant policy.
146 The court recognized this danger in a very early case. Van Keulen v. Sealander,
183 Wash. 634, 49 P.2d 19 (1935). It would appear that in an extreme violation of this
policy, restitution would be denied by the application of laches.
147 Stewart v. Moss, supra note 145 (vendor refused to allow truck, the subject of
the sale, to go into escrow, thereby preventing vendee from obtaining chattel mortgage
on the truck which was necessary for vendee to complete payaments to vendor; vendee
granted restitution of payments made).
On the other hand, in Krieg v. Salkovics, 18 Wn.2d 180, 138 P.2d 855 (1943), the
supreme court granted forfeiture of over $1,000 of payments and improvements to the
vendor, overruling the trial court's granting the vendee's assignee a fifteen-day grace
period. The court said that it would have affirmed the trial court's action as against
the original vendee. However, the fact that the assignee, a real estate agent, had purchased the property from the defaulting vendee after the vendor had declared forfeiture,
and that he had already arranged for a sale to a fourth party at a price 50% over the
price to the original vendee, induced the court to speculate that the assignee had purchased at a nominal sum, and hence the forfeiture would not exceed the vendor's injury.

148 See note 117 supra.

L49Jones-Short Motor Co. v. Bolin, 153 Wash. 198, 279 Pac. 395 (1929) (the court
stated, "as a general proposition ... in contracts of conditional sale, provisions for the
forfeiture to the vendor, in case of breach of the contract, of the down payment ...and
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what obscure,'"I Professor Williston states it is the usual holding.'
Cases citing this rule typically involved the collateral question of
whether the conditional sale vendor had made an election of remedies
in seeking the installments due, and therefore was barred from bringing an action to repossess the property.'5 2
The recent case of Gooden v. Hunter 5 shattered the clarity of the
Washington position on this issue. Judge Finley declared the question whether the contract was for a conditional sale or not to be of no
importance; and furthermore, assuming there was a conditional sale
of installments of the purchase price subsequently paid, as liquidated damages... are
valid and enforceable") ; Jarred v. Burrows, 143 Wash. 183, 255 Pac. 99 (1927)
(conditional sale of car; car was seized by federal agents for illegal transportation of
intoxicating liquor, a total breach by the vendee under the express terms of the contract; vendee denied damages in conversion suit brought after the authorities had
released the car to the conditional vendor) ; Eilers Music House v. Oriental Co., 69
Wash. 618, 125 Pac. 1023 (1912) (conditional sale contract, with forfeiture clause, of
pianorchestra; contract price was $1900 of which vendee had paid $893 when he defaulted; forfeiture of vendee's payments was allowed upon the vendor bringing replevin
for the chattel).
150 Most of the cases assume that forfeiture is allowed, and limit the opinion to the
election of remedies issue. (See cases in notes 151 and 152 infra.) In the Jones-Short
Motor Co. case, .supra note 149, three cases are cited as authority for the allowance of
forfeiture: Eilers Music House v. Oriental Co., stipra note 149; Pease v. Baxter, 12
Wash. 567, 41 Pac. 899 (1895) ; and Reddish v. Smith, 10 Wash. 178, 38 Pac. 1003
(1894). Both the Pease and Reddish cases concerned installment contracts for sale of
land, and this raises the question of the legal effect of that type of contract as contrasted to the conditional sale contract for chattel, with respect to the allowance of
forfeiture. See 3 WLISTON, CONTRACTs § 791 (rev. ed. 1936). The Pease opinion
appears to acquiesce in the argument of counsel that the contract there be viewed as a
conditional sale. Thus, the spectre of Ashford v. Reese again looms on the horizon.
1513 WiUIsvoN, op. cit. sipra note 150, § 736. Professor Williston states the
rationale for allowing forfeiture where the conditional vendor repossesses is that "the
consideration for the promise to pay was the conditional right given the buyer, and
'when a man acts in consideration of a conditional promise, if he gets the promise he
gets all that he is entitled to by his act, and if.. .the condition is not satisfied, and the
promise calls for no performance, there is no failure of consideration.' If the terms of
the bargain alone were to be considered, the exercise by the seller of his right to reclaim
the goods would not debar him from recovering the full price. The only reason for
denying him so broad a right is the equitable principle which forbids a forfeiture."
152 Standard Fin. Co. v. Townsend, 1 Wn.2d 274, 95 P.2d 786 (1939)
(vendor's
commencing action against vendee for installments due constituted election) ; Rodger
v. Johnson, 148 Wash. 675, 270 Pac. 105 (1928) (vendor's action on vendee's note for
balance of purchase price constituted election; hence vendor's judgment was not a lien
on the furniture, the subject matter of contract) ; Kimble Motor Car Co. v. Androw,
125 Wash. 225, 215 Pac. 340 (1923) (vendor's filing claim against vendee's estate for
installments due constituted election, hence vendor could not repossess) ; Eilers Music
House v. Douglass, 90 Wash. 683, 156 Pac. 937 (1916) (vendor's judgment for installments past due constitutes election, makes sale absolute even though additional unpaid
payments had accrued) ; Winton Motor Carriage Co. v. Broadway Auto. Co., 65 Wash.
650, 118 Pac. 817 (1911) (vendor's indorsing, to a bank, vendee's note for balance of
installments due, as collateral security for a bank loan to vendor, constituted election and
absolute title passed to the vendee, despite vendors subsequent taking up of the note).
For a case upholding the converse rule, that a vendor could not retain title and also
maintain a suit for the purchase price, without alleging damages caused by the vendee's
breach, see Hogan v. Kyle, 7 Wash. 595, 35 Pac. 399 (1894). However, this case
involved a contract for the sale of land.
Inasmuch as the Washington court
'53 154 Wash. Dec. 907, 344 P.2d 723 (1959).
granted a petition for rehearing of the Gooden decision in 155 Wash. Dec. 282, the
doubts raised by this case may have ceased to exist by the time this Comment is printed.
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and that the plaintiff-vendee was in default, such vendee was still entitled to restitution of payments. Judge Finley predicated this statement, with some justification, 54 on the reasoning that the absence of a
forfeiture clause in the Gooden contract entitled the vendee to the restitution relief. In making this distinction, Finley sharply disapproved
of the earlier Rider v. Cottle5 5 case. Both the Rider and Gooden cases
concerned a vendee who had abandoned the subject matter of the contract, the vendor subsequently repossessing. The language of both
opinions indicates concern about such repossession constituting "acquiescence" by the vendor of the vendee's offer of rescission. If this
language be construed as describing the issue of whether a promise to
make restitution can be implied from the conduct constituting the
mutual rescission agreement," 6 then the cases can be resolved as simply saying the absence or presence of a forfeiture clause will be a most
important factor on this interpretation question. Irrespective of this,
the result in Gooden has been reached in several jurisdictions outside
of Washington in cases where the contract was known to be for a conditional sale. 5 ' Time will tell whether the statement that it is of "no
importance" that the contract was a conditional sale will be employed
to grant a defaulting vendee restitution even though the contract includes a forfeiture clause, where the requirements of section 357 are
established.'
Forfeiture as failure of consideration. In several Washington cases
the defaulting vendee has contended that the vendor's declaration of
forfeiture raised the defense of failure of consideration against the
vendee's note being sued on.' 59 The availability of this defense would
154 Both the installment contracts for land (e.g., Reidt v. Smith, 75 Wash. 365, 134
Pac. 1057 (1913)) and the conditional sale of chattel cases generally required a forfeiture clause for the vendor to obtain forfeiture of the vendee's payments. Williston
also states that several courts allow the vendee to recover installments paid, less a
deduction for fair compensation for the use of the goods, where the vendor has repossessed the goods upon vendee's default, "at least if the contract does not provide for
forfeiture of such payments." 3 WiLLIsToN, CONTRACTS § 736 (rev. ed. 1936).
155 32 Wn.2d 538, 202 P.2d 741 (1949).
156 See note 13 supra, and its textual referent.
157 See cases cited in 3 WIssSToN, op. cit. supra note 154, § 736, n. 8.
158 It would seem to require an extreme fact situation to even raise this issue, since
the rapid depreciation of chattels may very well lead the court to hold the forfeiture
clause to be a valid liquidated damages provision.
159 Van Geest v. Willard, 27 Wn.2d 753, 180 P.2d 78 (1947) (defendant-maker gave
note as down payment on installment contract; note transferred to plaintiff-indorsee;
defendant defaulted and plaintiff declared forfeiture before note matured; defense of
failure of consideration held ineffective against plaintiff's action on note) ; Vickerman v.
Kapp, 167 Wash. 464, 9 P.2d 793 (1932) ($300 note given by vendee as part of down
payment on conditional sale contract for car; the court stated that the note was given
in lieu of cash, and hence the failure of consideration defense was not available to the
vendee in an action on the note after rescission of the contract). However, compare
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seem to depend on whether the vendee gave his note to secure future
payments, rather than as a past down payment, a queston of intent."'
In the event this defense fails, such a vendee ought also plead for re-

turn of the note on restitution principles, providing he can prove the
payments exceed the injury caused by his breach.

Aslford v. Reese."61 If taken literally, this notorious case ought to
have had considerable effect on the granting of restitution in installment contracts for sale of land. If it were true that the vendee had
((no interest, legal or equitable," including the right to possession, this

would logically make it more difficult for the defaulting vendee to gain
restitution of payments paid.'62 The fact that the Washington cases
have indicated no such trend is perhaps more evidence that Ashford

v. Reese is truly limited to the rule that risk of loss is on the vendor. 3
The fact that the court has granted restitution to vendees in default
despite the presence of a forfeiture clause also lends support to the

contention that the statement in Aylward v. Lally, 64 declaring the doctrine of Ashford to be limited to contracts containing forfeiture clauses,

is false." 5 It might be noted that if one desires to disregard title, the
Ashford result of finding risk of loss on the vendor can be neatly
reached on a quasi contract analysis. 6
Blenz v. Fogle, 127 Wash. 224, 220 Pac. 790 (1923) (defendant-vendee paid $1,000 in
cash as down payment on $37,000 installment contract; later defendant gave vendor a
$6,000 note, $9,000 then being past due on the contract; vendor later declared forfeiture;
vendor's action on note defeated on ground the note was only "additional evidence of
that much of the consideration remaining unpaid," and not given in lieu of cash);
Croup v. Humboldt Quartz & Placer Mining Co., 87 Wash. 248, 151 Pac. 493 (1915)
(findings in favor of defendant-maker affirmed in plaintiff-payee's action on note; the
trial court's findings were apparently based on the failure of consideration defense;
however, from the supreme court's language it is not clear whether it followed the
negotiable instruments defense or found a mutual rescission with a promise to make
restitution).
160 7 Am. J m. Bills And Notes § 255 (1937). In Van Geest v. Willard, supra note
159, the contractual language "purchase price is $1700, of which $500 has been paid,"
was held indicative that the $500 note was given as down payment. This issue is a
mixed question of law and fact. Van Geest v. Willard, supra note 159; Norman v.
Meeker, 91 Wash. 534, 158 Pac. 78 (1916).
161 132 Wash. 649, 233 Pac. 29 (1925).
162 The reasoning here would be that if the rental value of the property were to be
offset from the payments, the defaulting vendee in a typical long term installment
contract would have a near impossible burden of proving the payments were in excess
of the injury to the vendor resulting from the breach.
163 This interpretation was suggested long ago by Schweppe, The New Forfeiture
Clause Test in Executory Contracts for The Sale of Real Estate, 3 WAsHr. L. REV. 80
(1928). For deviations from Ashford even in this risk of loss area, with respect to the
distribution of the proceeds from fire insurance policies, see Comment, The VendorPurchaserRelationship in Washington, 22 WAsHr. L. REv. 110 (1947).
164 147 Wash. 29, 264 Pac. 983 (1928).
165 Schweppe, supra note 163.
166 Where there is a supervening event, ie., destruction of the house by fire, rendering performance by the vendor (promisor) impossible, and the vendor is not at fault,
the vendor is discharged so long as the event occurs before the vendee's final payment.
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Acquiescence. The Washington court has a tendency to bandy the
words "acquiescence" and "waiver" in its restitution cases. Under
proper analysis, conduct which might be characterized as "acquiescence" should be a determining factor in section 357 cases. Where
such conduct is by the defendant, this may be of help to a plaintiff
in default without a moral justification for his default."' However,
the Washington court's use of "rescission" in restitution cases has
greatly extended the possibilities for discovering acquiescence." 8 "Acquiescence" has been used to describe acceptance of an offer for mutual rescission, which results in the granting of restitution. 9 The word
has also been used to describe affirmance in voidable contract cases, 7 '
"acceptance" as used in the Uniform Sales Act,' 7' and a waiver of the
"right to rescind,' 7 all resulting in the denial of restitution. Where
the defendant-vendor has performed acts which can be characterized
§ 457. Where the vendee has rendered performance, either in part or
full, for which the vendor is excused from rendering the agreed exchange as a result of
such impossibility, the vendee can recover the value of what he has rendered (his payments) less the value of what he has received (rental value), except where the contract expressly provides otherwise. RESTATEMENT § 468(2).
167 See note 143 supra.
168 See note 26 supra.
169 Gooden v. Hunter, 154 Wash. Dec. 907, 344 P.2d 723 (1959) ; Tungsten Products,
Inc. v. Kimmel, 5 Wn.2d 572, 105 P.2d 822 (1940) ; McMillen v. Bancroft, 162 Wash.
175, 298 Pac. 460 (1931).
170 Frahm v. Moore, 168 Wash. 212, 11 P.2d 593 (1932).
171 See notes 83 and 143 supra. One case indicating the improper application of the
"acceptance" concept where such conduct was by the plaintiff seeking restitution was
Bayley v. Lewis, 39 Wn.2d 464, 236 P.2d 350 (1951) (defendant breached her contract
to forbear contesting of will, but in contest action she changed her mind; five months
later defendant sued for specific performance of the contract, and plaintiffs sought
restitution of the consideration paid defendant under the contract; the court stated that
while plaintiffs had the right to rescission upon defendant's breach, they lost this right
by not bringing action promptly). Since no prejudicial change of position by the defendant was shown, the Bayley case cannot be explained by laches. However, the
proper ground for the denial of restitution should be that the defendant had the right
to, and was granted, specific performance. See note 129 smpra.
'T2 Gillmore v. Green, 39 Wn.2d 431, 235 P.2d 998 (1951); Central Life Assur.
Soc'y v. Impelmans, 13 Wn.2d 632, 126 P.2d 757 (1942). It must not be thought that
waiver of "the right to rescind" means a waiver of the defendant's breach. If the
defendant's performance of the condition was a material part of the agreed exchange
(as would be necessary for its non-performance to give the plaintiff a right to restitution), then such a condition could not be excused by the plaintiff's waiver. RESTATEMENT § 297. (However, where the question of materiality of the breach is close, then
such "waiver" may operate against the materiality itself).
Assuming the condition in these cases was a material part of the agreed exchange,
the only analysis possible seems to be that the plaintiff's voluntary waiver removed the
condition precedent to his own duty of performance, and hence the plaintiff himself was
in default and the case falls under section 357. Therefore a finding of "unilateral
rescission" by the defendant will be necessary before the plaintiff will have a right to
restitution. Corbin remarks that courts are particularly astute to find a waiver or an
estoppel where forfeiture is involved. 3 CORBIN § 754. It may also be possible that the
court is misapplying the doctrine of "acceptance," in the Uniform Sales Act, to a land
contract. See note 83 supra.
RESTATEMENT
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as "acquiescence," it should be noted that this conduct can properly
be the basis of either the granting 7" or denying 7 " of restitution to the
plaintiff-vendee.
RESTITUTION AS A REmEDY FOR A CONTRACT WITHIN THE

STATUTE OF FRAUDS

The parties to a contract that is rendered unenforceable by the Statute of Frauds very frequently act in reliance on such contract by
rendering the agreed performance in part or in whole, or by making
improvements on land which is the subject matter of the contract.
Since the refusal of all relief would result in unjust enrichment, the
remedy of restitution is available here, even though the Statute bars
other remedies. 7 5 This is reasonable, since an action for restitution is
not the kind of enforcement of a contract that the Statute of Frauds
was designed to prevent. 7 '
As against a defendant who is not in default, and who is ready and
willing to perform the contract, the plaintiff has a right to restitution
only if the requirements of section 357 are satisfied, the same as in the
case of a contract not within the Statute of Frauds. 7 7
The Washington court, in Stanek v. Peterson,"" added a refinement
by holding that restitution would be denied to a vendor who rendered
performance with knowledge that the contract was unenforceable.
173

See note 169 supra, and its textual referent.

174 Where such "acquiescence" indicates the lack of unilateral rescission by the

vendor, in cases involving a plaintiff-vendee in default. See note 16 supra, and its
textual referent.
175 RESTATEMENT § 355. 2 CoaRix § 302. Stanek v. Peterson, 26 Wn.2d 385, 174
P.2d 308 (1946) (oral contract to sell land, vendors having knowledge such contract
unenforceable; vendees granted restitution of $1,000 down payment, but vendors denied
restitution for value of improvements on land rendered in preparation of sale) ; Cone v.
Ariss, 13 Wn.2d 650, 126 P.2d 591 (1942) (oral contract for vendee employee to purchase car at reduced price, to use it as salesman's demonstrator in vendor's employ,
and to pay price in 26 monthly installments; performance to be over a one-year period
and therefore in violation of Statute; vendee quit work and vendor repossessed car;
vendee granted restitution of $135 in payments less the depreciation to the car).
170 RESTATEMENT § 355, comment b. But, by the same token, restitution will not be
available
where the particular Statute of Frauds so provides. RESTATEMENT § 355(3).
77
'
RESTATEMENT § 355(4). Dubke v. Kassa, 29 Wn.2d 486, 187 P.2d 611 (1947)
(vendee made $250 payment on oral contract to sell real property; later vendee refused
to buy, although vendors remained ready and willing to sell; restitution of vendee's
payment denied).
Even a defendant in default can extinguish the plaintiff's right to the restitution of
the value of the goods by tendering restoration of the specific goods to the plaintiff, and
keeping the tender good. RESTATEMENT § 355 (2).
'78 26 Wn.2d 385, 174 P.2d 308 (1946). This rule is probably desirable for the reason
that otherwise such a vendor could make use of his greater knowledge to speculate
on the contract. Note, however, that the result in Stanek can be explained on other
grounds. See note 70 supra.
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CONCLUSION

Examination of the attorneys' briefs in these cases indicates considerable unawareness of the remedy of restitution and its mechanics.
The Washington court can hardly be criticized for its continued use
of "rescission" when cases are pleaded and argued in those terms.
If the client's adversary-vendor has committed total breach, then
restitution should be kept in mind by the attorney as a bonus, an
alternative remedy that may give a more favorable recovery.
If the client-vendee himself has committed total breach, or if the
facts are so conflicting that it is not certain who will ultimately be
considered guilty of total breach, then it is most critical to determine
whether section 357 will apply. If the client has ample funds to pay
the overdue installments, and indicates that he simply wished to "get
out" of the contract," 9 he should be advised that the best he can hope
for is an opportunity to reinstate the contract; and to insure obtaining
this he must tender the balance due to the vendor and, upon refusal,
deposit such balance in the trial court to establish some "equities."
However, where the vendee is insolvent, or is otherwise genuinely unable to reinstate the contract, there is no reason why he should not get
restitution, assuming such relief is pleaded and the requisite elements
are proven.'
Special emphasis should be placed on proving that the
vendee's payments are in excess of the injury to the vendor resulting
from the breach, and that the vendor has no right to specific performance of the contract.
The attorney advising the vendor under these circumstances should
make his client aware of the possibility of restitution; and should remind him that, excepting possibly the conditional sale of chattel cases,
the court is most reluctant to grant forfeiture in those instances where
the vendor is overeager and unreasonable in his desire to forfeit.'81
Moreover, it is important that the vendor remain ready and willing to
perform since this will prevent his right to specific performance from
terminating, 8' thus providing a defense to the vendee's action for restitution.
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179 In Van Keulen v. Sealander, 183 Wash. 634, 49 P.2d 19 (1935), the court granted

the vendor forfeiture of more than $4,000, under the belief that the vendee merely
"desired to escape from a bargain that had soured on his hands."
180 However to be safe, the client-vendee would be well advised to secure a temporary
injunction and post the bond required by WASH. RULES, APPEAL 24, prior to the time
vendor's notice of forfeiture expires. Such action ought to preserve the status quo
until a court decision can be had to determine whether restitution is available. Moeller
v. Good Hope Farms, Inc., 35 Wn.2d 777, 215 P.2d 425 (1950).
381 Stewart v. Moss, 30 Wn.2d 535, 192 P.2d 362 (1948).
182 5 CORBIN § 1130 at 579.

